Category: Blog

Death of the thrift shop?
By Ryan Long

Death of the thrift shop?

We all know the thirft shop. You go. You buy The Great Gatsby. It is used. It is cheap. It is a great read. And potentially illegal contraband? That could be so. Under the Second Circuit’s ruling in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, you may not resell copyrighted materials that are manufactured overseas in the U.S. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case on Monday. Until Congress amends the Copyrigt Act to limit the first sale doctrine to copyrighted materials manufactured in this U.S., the Supreme Court should overrule the Second Circuit.

Under the first sale doctrine, you are permitted to buy a book and then resell it. The copyright owner no longer has a right to restrain your use of the book once you have paid for it. However, there is a provision in the Copyright Act which prohibits you from importing copyrighted works into the U.S. without first obtaining the copyright owner’s permission. The question is whether that provision of the Act applies to copyrighted works that are used.

In Wiley, the Second Circuit was asked to resolve the apparent conflict between these provisions of the Copyright Act. The defendant had family members buy academic books overseas and then send the books to him in the U.S. When here, he sold the books for a profit. The books were manufactured overseas, and were protected by U.S. copyright law. The plaintiff, a publisher of some of the books that defendant was importing, sued him for copyright infringement, claiming he was violating their right to decide what copyrighted goods to import, or not. His defense was that he was protected by the first sale doctrine because all of the books he was importing were used. The lower court refused to instruct the jury about the potential applicability of the defense, and the man was found liable for copyright infringment.

Using some mental gymnastics, the Second Circuit held in Wiley that the first sale doctrine did not apply to the books in question because they were manufactured overseas, whereas there would have been a defense had the books been manufactured domestically. The Second Circuit came to this decision after reading a concurrence by Justice Ginsberg in Quality King, a previous Supreme Court decision in which the court held that the first sale doctrine applies to copyrighted products produced in the United States and resold here after being re-imported. Even though the majority opinion in Quality King didn’t peg its first sale doctrine holding to the fact that the product in question was domestically produced, Justice Ginsberg suggested a different outcome could result if a product were produced overseas and then imported.

It seems if Congress wanted to expand a copyright holder’s rights beyond the first sale depending on whether the product in question was produced oversears, it could easily do so by amending the Copyright Act. Until then, it seems the best way to keep cool local thrift shops (and others) from getting sued and put out of business by major book publishers (or others) for selling used books (or other copyrighted items) manufactured overseas is for the Supreme Court to reverse the Second Circuit.

You’re fired! (But I still have to pay you?)
By Ryan Long

You’re fired! (But I still have to pay you?)

We often think that if we fire someone, they are no longer entitled to be paid. But that is not always so. This is especially true in Hollywood, as can be seen from the recent ruling in the litigation between Lisa Kudrow and Scott Howard, her former manager, reports the Hollywood Reporter. While Ms. Kudrow fired Mr. Howard, he claims he is still entited to a percentage of her income even though they had no written agreement giving him such a right. Is this is a stretch? Yes and no.

Generally speaking, agreements can be for a term or at will. If they are for a term, say five years, they cannot usually be terminated before the term unless it is for cause — which means one of the parties breached the contract. If the agreement is at will, it can be terminated at anytime. Most agreements are at will. Regardless of which agreement you enter into, you can always negotiate for residual rights that exist after termination. For example, if you manage Mick Jagger and give him a management agreement which gives you the right to 5% of this income for five years even after the term of the agreement is over, which is called a “sunset clause,” then you get paid even when he is touring and you are no longer his manager.

The crinkle in Ms. Kudrow’s case is that there is no written agreement. Instead, the parties only had a verbal understanding of their relationship. This makes for tough proof at trial concerning the contours of this agreement. That’s why Mr. Howard sought to introduce what is called “custom and usage” evidence in the trial court. This evidence basically shows that some rule is so widely known in an industry and accepted that a party consents to the rule in any contract even if it isn’t explicitly written — or said — in the contract. The lower court rejected this argument because, in its view, the proffered expert in the case only entered the industry in 1998, which is after the parties made their agreement in 1991. The appellate court reversed and allowed the testimony.

Whether Mr. Howard wins at trial remains to be seen. However, in allowing the testimony of a custom and usage expert such as this one, the appellate court signaled to the entertainment industry that it is better to specifically contract out of these type of sunset clauses or else they may be presumed to exist in your contract even if it is not so written.

Aereo’s service — a public performance?
By Ryan Long

Aereo’s service — a public performance?

Recently, in American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., et. al., v. Aereo, Inc., the Southern District of New York denied the plaintiff’s motion to immediately stop Aereo, Inc. (“Aereo”), from retransmitting television programming, like NBC’s Saturday Night Live, to its users. While the Court took great pains to justify its conclusion that Aereo was not publicly performing, or “transmitting,” plaintiff’s copyrighted works within the meaning of the Copyright Act, its reasoning is likely flawed.

The best place to begin is the Copyright Act’s definition of “public performance.” Section 101 of the Act gives a copyright holder a government condoned monopoly to “perform or display a work ‘publicly,'” which means to “transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or different times.”

In its decision denying the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, the District Court found that Aereo’s method of distribution is similar to Cablevision’s Remote Storage DVR (“RS-DVR”) device. In Cartoon Network LP, v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 546 F.3d 1212 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Cablevision“), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the RS-DVR device did not publicly perform copyrighted works. As the reader may know, the RS-DVR device allows users to save their favorite programming for viewing at another time. If I am not home when Saturday Night Live is on, I can set my RS-DVR to record the program, in whole or in part, so that I can watch the program later on. And so the RS-DVR is similar to the Betamax recording device — which is like a VCR that allows you to record programs — that was upheld as a “fair use” of copyrighted materials in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).

But unlike the RS-DVR in Cablevision or the Betamax in Sony Corp., Aereo’s system not only allows the user the option of recording a program on its system for later viewing. It also permits the viewer to watch Saturday Night Live contemporaneously with its distribution from NBC. Because Aereo’s system doesn’t only permit their viewers to time shift their viewing of Saturday Night Live, but acts as a substitute for viewing the program live on NBC, its method of distribution looks, talks, and acts like a public performance.

Stick and stones may break my bones, but calling me gay when I’m not doesn’t — or can it?
By Ryan Long

Stick and stones may break my bones, but calling me gay when I’m not doesn’t — or can it?

We were all told when we were younger that sticks and stones can break our bones, but that words could not. While it is still true that words cannot break our bones, words can be actionable as defamation under the law. Until recently, it was defamation per se in New York to falsely accuse someone of being a homosexual. This means that all one needed to prove was that the statement was made and that is was false. Special damages were assumed. The recent decision by the Appellate Division, Third Department, in Yonaty v. Mincolla, changed all of that.

In Yonaty, the plaintiff, a male, alleged that a defendant, a female, falsely accused him of being a homosexual. As a result, the plaintiff alleged, he lost his girlfriend. The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s defamation claim on the ground that he did not allege special damages, such as lost profits or revenues, even assuming he was not a homosexual. The lower court denied the motion because of long standing law in New York, such as in cases like Klepetko v. Reisman, 41 A.D.3d 551, 552 (2d Dep’t 2007), which have held that falsely accusing someone of homosexuality was defamation per se, which means that damage was assumed. Examples of other defamation per se categories include accusing someone of being a felon or having a loathsome disease, such as herpes.

The Third Department in Yonaty ordered the dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint because he did not allege damages. In so holding, the Court contravened cases like Klepetko. That’s because, these prior decisions were, in the words of the Court, “based upon the flawed premise that it is shameful and disgraceful to be described as lesbian, gay or bisexual. In fact, such a rule necessarily equates individuals who are lesbian, gay or bisexual with those who have committed a ‘serious crime’  – one of the four established per se categories.” Watch USA online porn https://mat6tube.com teens, milfs, matures!

Nevertheless, the Court’s ruling still leaves the door open for defamation claims arising from false allegations of homosexuality that may, in fact, involve special damages. Assume, for example, that someone falsely claims a boy scout leader is a homosexual. Under the Court’s ruling in Yonaty, the leader may be able to claim defamation if he can show that (1) he is not a homosexual and (2) that he lost his job because of the false statement. The Boy Scouts of America currently prohibit homosexuals from occupying positions of leadership. Thus, the Court’s reasoning accepts that while society has changed in some areas concerning stereotypes surrounding sexual preference, it has not changed in others.

The unofficial Department of Justice guide to officiating Apple et al. (Godzilla) v. Amazon (King Kong)
By Ryan Long

The unofficial Department of Justice guide to officiating Apple et al. (Godzilla) v. Amazon (King Kong)

Wouldn’t you want to see who wins a cage match between Godzilla and King Kong? We certainly would. Until recently, that fight was under way. Major book publishers (“publishers”) and Apple, Inc. (“Apple”) (collectively “Godzilla”) were chipping way at the 90% market e-book share held by Amazon (“King Kong”). And yet on April 11, 2012, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) sued Godzilla alleging that it violated the antitrust laws. In light of the potentially tenuous merit of the lawsuit, it seems only fair that that the DOJ would investigate potential predatory pricing of e-books by King Kong, too.

The DOJ’s lawsuit is potentially tenuous because the publishers and Apple are not garden variety horizontal competitors fixing prices, as was the case when Sotheby’s and Christie’s, the famous auction houses, agreed to fix their commissions. Instead, the contracts between the publishers and Apple (“agency agreements”) are more akin to a vertical distribution agreement between a manufacturer and a retailer. The DOJ’s allegations, even if true,support this view.

Apple separately transacted with several book publishers to distribute their titles. In exchange, Apple received a 30% commission off the price of the book, which was negotiated between the publishers and Apple. This agency model replaced the wholesale model, in which publishers would sell to Apple at half of the retail price, and then let Apple sell at whatever price it wished. As any distributor with power would do, Apple obtained assurances in the agency agreements that the publishers would not do an end run around Apple and distribute via others, including Amazon, for less.

Even though the agency agreements are vertical, the DOJ is treating the them as though they were horizontal. The characterization makes a legal difference. On the one hand, courts review agreements (and conspiracies) among horizontal competitors to fix prices under the per se illegal standard. Once the agreement is proved, it is deemed illegal, regardless of its potential pro-competitive benefits or the market power of the competitors. On the other hand, courts review vertical resale price maintenance agreements among a manufacturer and a retailer, for example, under the rule of reason. Under this test, the court weighs the pro-competitive benefits of the agreement with its anti-competitive effects. Because the agency agreements are more akin to resale price maintenance contracts, they should likely be judged under the rule of reason, which makes the DOJ’s case tougher.

But regardless of which way the court ends up characterizing the relationship between the publishers and Apple, it seems at the very least that the DOJ should have investigated King Kong — that is, Amazon — for potential predatory pricing, too. Pricing below cost is unlawful if “it is part of a strategy to eliminate competitors, and when that strategy has a dangerous probability of creating a monopoly for the discounting firm so that it can raise prices far into the future and recoup its losses.” This sounds very similar to what King Kong has been doing by selling major titles below cost through its Kindle device, which currently occupies roughly 90% of the distribution market for e-books. It seems that publishers felt the only way to fight back was to agree to Apple’s agency agreements, which it demands of all content providers, so that the publishers could then withhold titles from Amazon unless it agreed to the same pricing structure they gave to Apple.

In the end, it might have been wrong for Godzilla to blow fire into King Kong’s face. But then it might have been wrong for King Kong to throw acid into Godzilla’s eyes. Either both sides should be scrutinized for their potential wrongs, or the referee — the DOJ — should stay out of the match and let the market decide who to favor.

CrestCare — Constitutional?
By Ryan Long

CrestCare — Constitutional?

The Obama administration recently passed CrestCare. Never heard of it? It is a new federal law which requires every citizen to brush their teeth with Crest brand toothpaste. Certainly, the law must be unconstitutional, although it would be nice not to smell bad breath on the elevator ride up to the office, or on the construction site, in the morning. And yet maybe, just maybe, the law would be upheld by the Supreme Court if it was ever challenged.

Of course, there is no CrestCare. It is a wonder whether the federal government would be empowered to pass such a law if the United States Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of ObamaCare’s requirement that all citizens have health insurance. On Monday, the high Court began hearing oral arguments to determine whether that part of ObamaCare, in addition to others, are constitutional. In the case, titled Department of Health & Human Services, et. al. v. States of Florida, et. al., No. 11-398, the attorney generals of various states have brought suit to bar enforcement of ObamaCare, the details of which have been covered ad nausea elsewhere, and which I will leave for your musings.

The marrow of the government’s argument as to why ObamaCare should be upheld is the Commerce Clause, which gives Congress the exclusive authority to “regulate commerce . . . among the several States.” That is my emphasis. Over the years, the Supreme Court has read “among” to include anything that could affect interstate commerce, even if the conduct in question is wholly intrastate in character. In Wickard v. Filburn, for example, the Court held in 1942 that the federal government could regulate a farmer’s growth of wheat in his own backyard even though it was for his own consumption. The reason: the farmer’s growth would affect the interstate flow of wheat. Then, in Gonzalez v. Reich, the high Court in 2005 held that the feds could regulate wholly intrastate consumption of marijuana under California’s Proposition 215.

While the Court’s decisions in both Wickard and Gonzalez stretch the limits of “among the several states” to their intellectual limits, neither decision dealt with a federal law compelling someone to do something. Instead, both decisions involved a federal law prohibiting someone from doing something. Whereas part of ObamaCare compels every living citizen to buy health insurance. This seems to stretch the Commerce Clause so far that it has no limits left. Even if you like the idea of nationalized healthcare, this is not a constitutionally permissible way to go about it.

If the Court upholds the part of ObamaCare mandating health insurance for all citizens on Commerce Clause grounds, there is nothing barring the feds — or Crest — from mandating CrestCare.

Eat your cake but you shouldn’t be able to have it, too.
By Ryan Long

Eat your cake but you shouldn’t be able to have it, too.

Dewey, Cheatem, & Howe. P.C. (“Dewey”) is a Dutch based professional corporation, pictured above, that helps Somalia pirates rob and steal from you, a Nigerian citizen, on the high seas. The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments on Tuesday in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Pertroleum Company to determine whether you would be able to sue Dewey in the United States under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) even though Dewey is a corporation. Given that corporations are considered “persons” for First Amendment purposes, companies should also be considered persons subject to suit under ATS. Otherwise, the lawyers at Dewey — Curly, Moe, and Larry — would be free to aid and abet the pirates, while none of them alone would be able to.

In Kiobel, 12 Nigerian citizens sued Royal Dutch Petroleum (“Royal Dutch”) under the ATS in U.S. federal court for allegedly aiding and abetting human rights violations by the Abacha dictatorship in Nigeria. The ATS, passed in 1789, allows federal courts to hear “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” The issue in the case is whether Royal Dutch may be sued even though it is a company and not a natural person. The law to date has only included natural persons within the scope of the ATS, which only defines who may sue but not who may be sued.

The opposing sides have arguments that are not supported by the text of the statute. Royal Dutch’s appellate lawyer, Kathleen Sullivan, argued to the Court that “[t]here is no country in the world that provides a civil cause of action against a corporation under their domestic law for a violation of the of nations,” reports The New York Times in Court Debates Rights Case Aimed at Corporations. Instead, she claims that “every convention for every international tribune excludes corporations.” The deputy solicitor general, Edwin S. Kneedler, argues on behalf of the plaintiffs that there need not to be a constraint on who may or may not be sued under the ATS because it “does not identify who the defendant may be.”

Regardless of what other countries do or the absence of textual guidance in the ATS, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its position that corporations are “persons” within the meaning of the First Amendment in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commissions. If Dewey were a professional corporation based in New York, it would have just as much protection under the First Amendment as you do. Given that this is the law of the land, it seems intellectually disingenuous to count corporations beyond the scope of the ATS as a matter of law but within the scope of the First Amendment. It seems a better approach would be to allow suits against companies like Dewey or Royal Dutch under the ATS but then potentially dismiss the suit for other reasons, including no violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States, until Congress hopefully amends the ATS to make it clearer.

 

Dude, you lost my 1.2 billion!
By Ryan Long

Dude, you lost my 1.2 billion!

It appears the previous title of our blog entry, which was “Dude, where’s my $1.2 billion?,” is no longer apt. The Journal recently reported in Money From MF Global Feared Gone that the $1.2 billion has been lost and will not be found. So we have aptly changed our tune in this blog entry’s title. In addition, we have a new main character in the debacle in addition to Mr. Corzine, and that is former FBI director Mr. Louis Freeh. He recently claimed attorney-client privilege to shield the gaze by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) into MF Global’s affairs. Can he do that? Probably so.

Of course, separate and apart from the suspicions that the claim of privilege raises under these circumstances, there is also the question as to its legitimacy. Whether it is not legitimate really depends on the circumstances, the contours of which we don’t know at this point.

In the garden variety case, the privilege applies to protect private communications between an attorney and a client in the rendering of legal advise. So if Jack the Ripper tells Clarence Darrow, his lawyer, in private about murders Mr. Ripper previously committed and wants to know how to best defend himself in the court of law, that conversation is protected. It is still protected if Mr. Darrow’s paralegal or other advisor he hired is present. If, however, Mr. Ripper tells Mr. Darrow about a murder he is in the process of committing or is about to commit, then Mr. Darrow could tell authorities to prevent the harm.

In this case, Mr. Freeh is not a lawyer but he may have been assisting MF’s lawyers in the investigation, and so the privilege could still apply. We don’t know if the $1.2 billion has in fact been lost or is in the process of getting lost. If the money is currently being absconded, then Mr. Freeh — or one of his assistants — could divulge the protected conversation under some state’s ethical rules, but not others. For example, in California, there would need to be the threat of serious bodily harm in order for Mr. Freeh to have the option, whereas in New York it is enough for the client to have the intent to commit a crime, even if there is no bodily harm. Of course, if the money is already gone, then Mr. Freeh may not divulge the information.

Regardless if the CFTC is able to have any luck overcoming the attorney-client privilege here, there have been several class actions filed by sophisticated class action firms against MF Global. These firms employ forensic accountants who can find things out about the money even without Mr. Freeh’s assistance. In the end, we may eventually see if there is an answer to our original question: “Dude, where’s my $1.2 billion?” We hope so.

Dude, where’s my 1.2 billion?
By Ryan Long

Dude, where’s my 1.2 billion?

“Dude, where’s my car?” This was the famous question asked by the stoners in the 2000 movie called Dude, Where’s My Car?We ask the same question of Mr. Corzine: “Dude, where’s my $1.2 billion?” According to the USA Today, he recently testified that “I simply do not know where the money is” in front of Congress. Of course, this may be true. But the question is whether that will be enough to get him off the hook for civil and/or criminal claims that may arise from the downfall of MF Global.

Embezzlement is the first crime that comes to mind. In New York, there is no civil cause of action for embezzlement. But the state could bring a criminal case against Mr. Corzine if it could prove: (1) the $1.2 billion involved belonged to investors; (2) the money was converted or used for Mr. Corzine’s purposes; (3) Mr. Corzine was in a position of trust and possessed legal possession of (or access to) the money; and (4) the Mr. Corzine knowingly defrauded the owner of the property.

Of course, we don’t know the full factual picture of the situation with MF Global. But assume for the purpose of discussion that Mr. Corzine did not know where the money went, which roughly covers elements (2) and (4). Certainly some of his underlings knew. The issue in the case would then be whether their knowledge could, under the circumstances, be imputed to Mr. Corzine. After all, intent is generally a mental state that juries infer from the circumstances, since folks rarely state point blank: “now I know I am embezzling money and that what I am doing is illegal.” But it might be difficult to show that he knew or should have known what his underlings were doing, depending on how far down the totem pole they were and where the money ended up.

Regardless, it seems to run afoul of common sense that MF Global could not trace such a large amount of money as though they forgot in which parking spot they put the car at the shopping mall. Certainly, Mr. Corzine will face additional questioning from authorities. But what remains odd in the whole scenario is how they are approaching him with kid gloves. Unlock forex success with these insights. fx success . Trade smarter today. It seems if either dude in Dude, Where’s My Car? were overseeing an institution that misplaced such a large amount of money, they would likely be sitting in jail until the money was accounted for.

An offer you can’t refuse.
By Ryan Long

An offer you can’t refuse.

The WSJ recently reported in Zynga Leans on Some Workers to Surrender Pre-IPO Shares that the technology company is making certain employees an offer they can’t refuse: cough up your pre-IPO stock options or your first born is dead.  Well, not really. The threat is that the employee will lose his or her job. While it is understandable that the company doesn’t want to have another Google cook who makes out like a bandit when Zynga goes IPO, it is also unclear whether Zynga’s approach is either legal or wise.

Under New York’s Limited Liability Company Act, for example, an employee’s sweat equity is valued like a cash contribution. So if you offer $50,000.00 of your cooking services to a cash starved start-up in exchange for 2% of the company and a measly $25,000.00 salary, you are in the same position as another investor who put in $50,000.00 cash for 2%. Of course, you could end up getting a windfall if the company eventually goes public and is worth $2 billion.

That is the position Zynga is about to find itself when it goes public. To rectify the problem of attracting new talent with not enough shares to dole out, the company is apparently going to certain employees and demanding that they return some or all of their stock options, or else. If this is merely a case buyer’s remorse, then Zynga will be asking for a great deal of breach of contract and wrongful termination litigation from terminated employees. Of course, if the employees have not lived up to their part of the bargain, then the law in New York at least allows companies like Zynga to ask for interests back under threat of breach of contract litigation against the employee.

In either case, it doesn’t seem like good business. People will be more reticent to work with start-ups if they expect that, down the line, the company will finagle them out of their not yet vested stock options so that they can go to more efficient resources — i.e. more valuable people. If a company is worried about getting itself into a tight bind like this, it seems better to hybrid the transaction with some cash so that the company doesn’t find itself later on with not enough stock to go around, or, worse, embroiled in class action litigation. Otherwise, the company shouldn’t make the deal in the first place.